业绩期望落差对商誉泡沫的影响研究

• 作者： 徐可鑫 ¹ 夏贻琛 ² 任宗强 ¹
• 作者单位：
  1.  温州大学商学院

  2.  南安普顿大学
• 发布时间：2024-10-28

摘要: 巨额商誉泡沫是上市公司稳健经营和资本市场平稳运行的潜在风险，而业绩期望落差会对商誉泡沫产生影响并引导企业进行战略调整，研究企业业绩期望落差对商誉泡沫的影响机制十分重要。基于企业行为理论及权变理论，本文以2011—2021年中国A股上市公司为研究对象，剖析了业绩期望落差如何扭曲企业并购决策，催生出商誉泡沫这一潜在隐患。研究发现，随着业绩期望落差的扩大，企业商誉泡沫先降后升，呈正U型关系；高管过度自信与经济政策不确定性起正向调节作用，而财务冗余起反向调节作用。本文旨在丰富业绩期望落差和企业商誉领域的研究，以期为企业风险管理和监管部门化解商誉泡沫提供新思路和新范式。

Abstract: The colossal goodwill bubble poses a signifi cant risk to the stable operation of listed companies and the stable functioning of capital markets. The performance aspiration gap infl uences the goodwill bubble and guides corporate strategic adjustments, underscoring the signifi cance of exploring the mechanisms through which corporate performance aspiration gaps aff ect the goodwill bubble. Drawing upon the Behavioral Theory of the Firm and Contingency Theory, this study examines A-share listed companies in China from 2011 to 2021, analyzing how performance aspiration gaps distort corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions, thereby fostering the potential hazard of goodwill bubbles. The fi ndings reveal that as the performance aspiration gap widens, the corporate goodwill bubble initially contracts before increasing, demonstrating an inverted U-shaped relationship. Executive overconfi dence and economic policy uncertainty play positive moderating roles, whereas fi nancial slack exerts a negative moderating eff ect. This article aims to enrich the research on performance expectation gaps and corporate goodwill, with the goal of providing new ideas and paradigms for enterprises' risk management and regulatory agencies to mitigate goodwill bubbles.

• 分类： 工商管理学 >> 会计学
• 稿件状态： 已在期刊出版
期刊名称： 《中国商论》 2024年 第19期
• 引用： PSSXiv:202410.02456 (或此版本 PSSXiv:202410.02456V1)
  DOI:10.19699/j.cnki.issn2096-0298.2024.19.155
  CSTR:32012.36.PSSXiv.202410.02456
• 推荐引用方式： 徐可鑫,夏贻琛,任宗强.业绩期望落差对商誉泡沫的影响研究.中国商论,2024(19).[DOI:10.19699/j.cnki.issn2096-0298.2024.19.155] (点此复制)