运动式治理、常态化督查与企业漂绿行为

• 作者： 何枫 ¹ 赵婷茹 ¹
• 作者单位：
  1.  北京科技大学-经济管理学院
• 发布时间：2025-02-03

摘要: 运动式治理与常态化治理是理解中国环境政策执行方式的一组重要分析框架。中央环保督察兼具运动式治理特征和常态化治理特征，为考察两者的异质性提供了良好的研究基础。本文分别以中央环保督察制度体系中的环保督察组进驻、环保督察局设立为政策冲击，考察运动式治理和常态化治理对企业漂绿行为的差异化影响效应。首先，在考虑公众环境参与的情况下，构建中央政府、地方政府、社会公众和污染企业四方博弈演化模型，理论分析中央政府不同治理手段下污染企业漂绿行为的决策响应逻辑，并提出研究假设；其次，构建单阶段双重差分模型和双阶段双重差分模型，实证分析运动式治理和常态化治理对企业漂绿行为的边际效应。最后，进一步讨论了公众环境参与的调节效应和企业所有制异质性。研究发现：第一，常态化治理手段能够显著抑制企业漂绿行为，而运动式治理手段没有产生显著的影响。并且，企业所在地离督察局越远，所受到的督察监管作用越弱，抑制效应越小；第二，社会公众环境关注影响中央环保督察的实施效果，社会公众环境关注度越高，中央环保督察抑制企业漂绿的作用越强，反之越弱；第三，国有企业在“漂绿”方面受到更多抑制。本文的结论对政策制定者调控环境治理手段、遏制企业漂绿行为提供了有价值的理论参考。

Abstract: Campaign governance and normal governance are an important analytical framework for understanding the implementation of environmental policies in China. The central environmental protection inspector has both the characteristics of sports governance and the characteristics of normal governance, which provides a good research basis for investigating the heterogeneity of the two. In this paper, the environmental protection supervision team in the central environmental protection supervision system and the establishment of environmental protection supervision bureau are respectively regarded as policy impacts to investigate the differentiated effects of campaign governance and normal governance on enterprises' greenwashing behavior. First of all, considering the participation of the public in the environment, the four-party game evolution model of the central government, local government, the public and polluters is constructed. The decision response logic of polluters' greenwashing behavior under different governance measures of the central government is theoretically analyzed, and the research hypothesis is proposed. Secondly, a single-stage differential model and a two-stage differential model are constructed to empirically analyze the marginal effects of dynamic governance and normal governance on enterprises' greenwashing behavior. Finally, the moderating effects of public environmental participation and the heterogeneity of enterprise ownership are further discussed. The findings are as follows: First, the normal governance can significantly inhibit the greenwashing behavior of enterprises, while the campaign governance has no significant impact. Moreover, the farther away the enterprise is from the inspection bureau, the weaker the supervision effect and the smaller the inhibition effect. Second, the public environmental concern affects the implementation effect of the central environmental protection inspector, the higher the public environmental concern, the stronger the role of the central environmental protection inspector in inhibiting the greenwashing of enterprises, and the weaker the vice versa; Third, state-owned enterprises are more inhibited in greenwashing. The conclusion of this paper provides a valuable theoretical reference for policy makers to regulate the means of environmental governance and curb the greenwashing behavior of enterprises.

• 来自： 赵婷茹
• 分类： 公共管理学 >> 行政管理
• 稿件状态： 已投稿期刊
• 引用： PSSXiv:202502.00021 (或此版本 PSSXiv:202502.00021V1)
  DOI:10.12451/202502.00021
  CSTR:32012.36.PSSXiv202502.00021
• 推荐引用方式： 何枫,赵婷茹.运动式治理、常态化督查与企业漂绿行为.哲学社会科学预印本平台:https://zsyyb.cn/abs/202502.00021.[PSSXiv:202502.00021V1] (点此复制)